| For the full language involving Mens Rea: |
| III. MENS REA |
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The court next addresses defendant's motion to determine the state of mind required for criminal violations of the Act (DE 19). The provisions under which the defendant is charged provide for criminal penalties when the taking or possession of the protected species is committed "knowingly". 16 U.S.C. Sect. 1540(b)(1). Billie argues that, in order to convict, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt his knowledge that (1) the animal he shot was a Florida panther, and (2) it was a crime to do so on the Seminole Indian Reservations. Because the Government concedes that it could prove only general intent, a holding that specific intent is necessary would result in dismissal of the information. |
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A. Knowledge of the Subspecies |
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Billie acknowledges that the Government need not prove he knew at the time of the shooting that the animal was listed as endangered but argues that it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the panther was a felis concolor coryi (DE 35), the specific subspecies of panther which is listed as endangered. The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress did "not intend to make knowledge of the law an element" of a criminal violation, H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 9453, 9476. Notwithstanding, Billie contends that Congress must have meant something when it used the word "knowingly". |
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The court finds the defendant's argument to be without support in law or reason. In general, the word "knowingly" means "that the act was done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or accident". This is the definition provided in the Pattern Jury Instructions for criminal cases which is distributed by the District Judges Association of the Eleventh Circuit. Such a definition comports with the general rule that criminal penalties attached to regulatory statutes intended to protect public health, safety, or welfare should be construed to effectuate their regulatory purpose. See United States v Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662,666 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1208, 105 S. Ct. 1171, 84 L.Ed. 2d 321 (1985). The Act is a regulatory statute, enacted to conserve and protect endangered species. See 16. U.S.C. Sect. 1531(a), (b); Tennessee Valley Authority, 437 U.S. 153, 98 S. Ct. 2279 (plain intent of Congress in enacting Act was to halt and reverse trend towards species extinction, whatever the cost); cf. United States v Engler, 806 F 2d 425, 432 (3d Cr. 1986) (Migratory Bird Treaty Act is public welfare regulatory measure). In the court's view, the construction advanced by defendant would eviscerate the Act's purpose because it would be nearly impossible to prove that the average hunter recognized the particular subspecies protected under the Act. Accordingly, the Government need prove only that the defendant acted with general intent when he shot the animal in question………. |